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COMMENT 215 guidance concerning the order and priority of persons with the right to control final disposition, 14 nearly half lack forfeiture provisions 15 to account for situations in which one of those individuals is criminally responsible for the decedent's death. 16 Furthermore, even state statutes that do have forfeiture provisions often do not provide adequate coverage. First, some provisions do not encompass all victim-offender relationships; several address only certain categories of familial homicides, like spousal murders, while others do not provide for forfeiture if the deceased specifically designated the slayer to act as his or her agent for disposition. 17 Second, many provisions only contemplate forfeiture once criminal charges have been brought, ignoring the timing considerations involved with making disposition decisions as well as establishing probable cause for an arrest. 18 Third, statutes often do not provide an individual who has forfeited the right of disposition the opportunity to challenge the forfeiture in a timely manner. 19 States must ensure that disposition rights are not granted to slayers by virtue of poorly crafted disposition of remains statutes. 20 Instead, these statutes should require forfeiture for any person granted the right to control disposition, whether by designation or by law, who is criminally responsible for the decedent's death. Forfeiture is essential to protect not only a decedent from being victimized a second time by his or her slayer but also the victim's grieving survivors from being rendered powerless and unable to control the final resting place of their loved one. As long as an individual subject to forfeiture is given notice and an opportunity to be heard when forfeiture takes place, the rights of all parties-the accused, the surviving family members, and the victim-will be 14. See infra notes 91, 137. 15. A forfeiture provision is a clause in a statute "stating that, under certain circumstances," a person must lose "a right, privilege, or property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 722 (defining "forfeiture" and "forfeiture clause").
16. 
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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 taken into account, and the right of disposition will be in the proper hands. This Comment examines the current state of disposition of remains laws in the United States, identifies the problematic loopholes present in many statutes that permit slayers to control the disposition of their victims' bodies, and recommends the necessary statutory amendments to keep disposition rights out of the hands of slayers. Part I discusses the evolution of the American slayer rule, as well as its inherent limitation-The victim's body is not treated as property forming part of the victim's estate, and thus the slayer rule does not cover the right to control the disposition of a decedent's body. The slayer's ability to control the disposition is therefore treated within state statutory regimes governing the disposition of remains. Part II examines current statutory regimes in states without forfeiture provisions and also highlights the deficiencies present in regimes that do call for forfeiture. Part III provides guidance for state legislatures seeking to revise their disposition of remains laws to prevent slayers from potentially having the legal authority to control their victims' dispositions. In doing so, Part III makes recommendations for determining the proper scope of forfeiture provisions and for safeguarding due process rights. Finally, the Appendix contains a model disposition of remains statute encompassing the statutory provisions necessary to keep disposition rights out of the hands of slayers.
I. FAMILY HOMICIDES AND THE SLAYER RULE
Domestic violence experts have noted that " '[w] ith the exception of the police and the military, the family is perhaps the most violent social group, and the home the most violent social setting, in our society. '" 21 In the United States, 22% of homicide victims are killed by a spouse or another family member. 22 Between 1980 and 2008, the offender in 10% of homicides was a spouse, and 12% of offenders were other family members of the victim. 23 This latter statistic includes parricide (the murder of a parent by a child), 21 . Robin L. Preble, Family Violence and Family Property: A Proposal for Reform, 13 LAW & INEQ. 401, 403 (1995) UNITED STATES, 1980 -2008 16 (2011 , available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf. This statistic only includes homicides for which the victim-offender relationship was known. Id. 23. Id. 
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COMMENT 217 filicide (the killing of a child by a parent), and siblicide (the murder of a sibling).
24
Although there is now heightened awareness and concern surrounding family violence, 25 domestic violence has largely been ignored due to society's traditional belief that it was a "private matter" that was "best resolved behind closed doors." 26 While criminal law has evolved to address family violence, 27 the legal response to familial homicides has been complicated by this traditional societal view. 28 Consequently, there is still much progress to be made. 29 
A. The Slayer Rule and Slayer Statutes
The problem of familial murders is not new. 30 Although the law cannot mend the harm caused by such killings, courts and legislatures have supplemented criminal law punishments with the common law slayer rule, " [t] he doctrine that neither a person who kills another nor the killer's heirs can share in the decedent's 24. Although these categories of family homicide are the most common, this statistic also includes homicides committed by other family members. Id. at 21. For a discussion of the different types of family homicides, see Chelsea Diem & Jesenia M. Pizarro, Social Structure and Family Homicides, 25 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 521 (2010) . 25. See Proclamation No. 887777, 77 Fed. Reg. 60,611 (Oct. 1, 2012 
The Evolution of the American Slayer Rule
At early English common law, the doctrines of attainder, forfeiture of lands and chattels, corruption of blood, and escheat obviated the need for a slayer rule, as neither a slayer nor the slayer's heirs had the opportunity to benefit from the criminal wrongdoing. 36 34. Sneddon, supra note 30, at 102. 35. Cohen, supra note 12, at 794. Civil law countries also refuse to permit slayers to inherit property from their victims under the doctrine of unworthy heirs. "Unworthiness is derived from two Roman institutions: (1) Exheredatio, the power of the father to exclude his children from the succession; . . . . [and] (2) Eremptorium, the exclusion of certain heirs for unworthiness, in case of the decedent's silence." 3 MARCEL PLANIOL, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 517-18 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 1959 ) (11th ed. 1938 ). An unworthy person is deprived of his succession because he has "failed in some duty towards the deceased" and, therefore, does "not deserve to inherit from him." KATHRYN VENTURATOS LORIO, SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 5:3, in 10 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 141 (2d ed. 2009 REV. 229, 232-33 (1942) . As incidents of attainder, the land and property of the criminal were then forfeited to the King as punishment, which would have included any property the criminal inherited from the victim. Id. The doctrine of corruption of blood barred the murderer's heirs "unto the remotest generation" from inheriting, as the "blood of the attainted person was said to be corrupt." Id. at 233. Furthermore, under the law of feudal escheat, which "was superadded to the earlier law of forfeiture," the felon's land was said to escheat to the lord because he or she left no lawful successor-the felon's bloodline was corrupted, so its inheritable quality was extinguished and "blotted out forever." Id. at 233-34. Because the crown was very frequently also the superior lord, the two doctrines of forfeiture and escheat have often been confused. 
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COMMENT 219 of statutes to eliminate these archaic doctrines. 37 Fifty-six years later it passed the Forfeiture Act of 1870, which "abolished the entire doctrine of attainder, forfeiture and corruption of blood, or escheat."
38 It was not until after this Act was passed that the courts of England were faced with the situation of slayers potentially taking their victims' property. 39 To address the problem, the courts promulgated the "rule of public policy," which prohibited slayers from benefiting from their own wrongdoing.
40
Because Parliament did not pass the Forfeiture Act until after the American Revolution took place, the law in colonial America initially encompassed the early common law doctrines.
41 Their existence, however, was relatively short-lived; constitutional and statutory enactments soon expressly abrogated them. 42 As a result, slayers attempted to reap benefits from their crimes, claiming that otherwise they were "being denied what was 'rightfully' theirs." 43 In response, American courts also relied on the rule of public policy forfeiture of the offender's land and possessions to the King as criminal punishment was the doctrine of the old Anglo-Saxon law-it had nothing to do with the feudal system. Id. at 316-17. Feudal escheat did not come about in England until the time of the Norman Conquest. Id. at 317. Feudal escheat was at first subordinate to the law of forfeiture but later prevalent during the English feudal period. Reppy, supra, at 233-34. Under feudal escheat, a tenant's conviction was considered a breach of the lease of the land, so the feud reverted back to the superior lord. ENCYCLOPAEDIA, supra, at 316. If the King acquired an estate as the superior lord, it was not as a sovereign but rather as a proprietor. Id. Further, forfeiture applied to both land and possessions, while escheat applied only to land. 
The Rule of Public Policy
Unlike the penal nature of criminal law or the compensatory function of tort law, the slayer rule, the name frequently used to refer to the rule of public policy, instead propagates the maxim that no man shall benefit or profit from his wrong. 45 The underlying moral principle is that human life is sacred. 46 Additionally, "[t]he law of unjust enrichment forecloses the possibility that a person might benefit from committing a felonious and intentional homicide."
47 Further, an individual should not be legally permitted to control the transfer of another's property by bringing about that person's death. 48 These principles also seek to preserve the victim's intent-presumably that he or she would not want the slayer to benefit by virtue of the killing.
49
In the early 20th century, states began adopting "slayer statutes" in order to prevent slayers from receiving property as a result of killing their victims. 50 Early English common law adopted the position that there was no right of property-and thus no ownership right-in dead bodies. 58 The English courts developed this rule in response to citizens' attempts to direct the disposition of their remains by testament. 59 As Sir Edward Coke famously stated, the burial of corpses was "nullius in bonis" 60 -belonging to no one; 61 thus, disposition could not be declared by will. 62 Legal scholars believe that this rule was promulgated as a result of the jurisdictional divide between the secular courts and ecclesiastical courts in England.
63
Because people were traditionally buried in church cemeteries, 64 the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over the dead and the burial process instead of the secular courts. 65 The dead were considered objects sacred to God rather than objects of property.
66
American courts initially adopted the English common law rule that there are no property rights in the dead. 67 Thus, the body is not treated as property that forms part of the estate, 68 and consequently slayer statutes do not revoke the right to dispose of a decedent's remains. Because there is no true property right in a dead body, 69 the theory of "quasi-property" emerged as a way for courts to mitigate the harsh consequences of the common law rule. 195, 228 (1996) . 67. Id. 68. W. C. Rodgers, Property Rights in Human Bodies, 73 CENT. L.J. 39, 39 (1911) ("But the body does not descend by inheritance. The heir inherits the property of his ancestor, dying intestate, yet he will not come into the possession or ownership of his dead body through the law of descent.").
69. 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 2 (Westlaw 2013). 70. Ducor, supra note 66, at 228-29. Over time, English courts also began to recognize a quasi-property right of the next of kin in the decedent's body. Kester, supra note 20, at 574.
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II. AN EXAMINATION OF DISPOSITION OF REMAINS STATUTES
Nearly all states have enacted special legislation to create legal recognition of the quasi-property right of next of kin and other individuals in a decedent's remains for disposition purposes. 71 However, these disposition of remains statutes vary widely, especially with respect to the inclusion and scope of forfeiture provisions.
A. Rights in Remains
The majority of U.S. courts faced with the issue of whether there is a property interest in a decedent's remains agree that some kind of right does exist and often label it as a "quasi-property right."
72 As quasi-property, no one owns the decedent's body, but instead there is a custodial interest over the deceased person's remains for purposes of disposition. 73 In England, the right and duty to dispose of remains belongs to the executor. 74 However, this is not the case in the United States. Because the body is not considered property included as part of the probate estate, 75 it is not subject to administration by the executor. 76 Instead, the right vests in the decedent's next of kin-"[t]he person or persons most closely related to a decedent by blood or affinity." Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1989); Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984) ). However, some courts have abandoned the quasi-property theory in favor of a mental anguish or infliction of emotional distress tort remedy, suggesting that the quasi-property right in a body is a legal fiction that does not protect a true ownership interest. Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 385 (2000) .
73. Balganesh, supra note 58, at 1897. 75. The probate estate is "[a] decedent's property subject to administration by a personal representative. The probate estate comprises property owned by the decedent at the time of death and property acquired by the decedent's estate at or after the time of death." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1322.
76. Haddleton, supra note 74, at 56. 77. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1142. Although the specific rights granted by statute vary by state, "toward the end of the 19th century, . . . courts began to recognize an exclusive right of the next of kin to possess and control the disposition of the bodies of their dead relatives, the violation of which was actionable at law." Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2002) .
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This right generally includes not only the right to determine the timing, place, and manner of disposition 78 but also "the right to have [the body] remain in its final resting place, the right to remove the body to a proper place, and the right to maintain an action to recover damages for any outrage, indignity, or injury to the body of the deceased."
79 Although some courts differ on the exact classification of the interest, 80 every state has codified the principle that a decedent's next of kin have an exclusive right to possess the decedent's remains for the purpose of disposition.
81 Right of disposition statutes provide a list of persons, generally in order of priority, who have the right to control the disposition of a decedent's remains. 82 The traditional rule in most jurisdictions is that the right of disposition vests first in the surviving spouse. 83 This order of priority stems from the early belief that " [t] he bond of matrimony is the closest of all human ties." 80. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 480-81 (6th Cir. 1991 92. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.420 ("In the event that a homicide has been committed and the person charged . . . refuses to permit the burial of the . . . victim of his or her alleged homicide, any member of the family of the deceased . . . may apply to [the court] for an order to release the body of the deceased [for disposition]."); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-511 ("An individual may file a petition with the appropriate court to obtain the authority to be authorizing agent" if he alleges that permitting the person to have authority "may cause substantial injustice" or if the individual "had a closer personal affinity to the decedent and should be allowed to make the arrangements."); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 305 (allowing the filing of "a petition alleging enduring estrangement, incompetence, contrary intent or waiver and agreement"); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2807.01 ("In the absence of a designation . . . when there is a disagreement among a decedent's next of kin concerning the arrangements for his funeral or the disposition of his remains, any of the next of kin may petition the circuit court where the decedent resided at the time of his death to determine which of the next of kin shall have the authority to make arrangements for the decedent's funeral or the disposition of his remains."). 101 If no surviving spouse exists or a petition for divorce is filed, the right devolves to the surviving adult children and continues down the list of next of kin.
2013]
102 As currently written, Louisiana's statute leaves open the possibility that the person granted the right of disposition is the slayer who took the decedent's life.
b. Nevada
Nevada has likewise led the nation in the rate of female-victim and male-offender homicides, ranking first for the past three years.
103
Despite holding this rank for five of the past six years 104 and having a rate more than twice the national average, 105 Nevada has yet to include a forfeiture provision within its disposition of remains statute. In Nevada, a person may authorize another to make his or her burial arrangements through a legally valid document or in an affidavit.
106 If no such person has been designated, that right then vests in the surviving spouse and continues down the order of next of kin. To make matters more confusing, there is a section in the Thanatopractice regulations entitled "Cremation; requirements; right to authorize cremation; disposition of cremains," which combines the language of both sections.
112
Both sections 24-12A-2 and 61-32-19 describe the priority of persons who can decide disposition if no written instructions are left by the decedent. The first person listed in both statutes is the surviving spouse, followed by the next of kin.
113 While these statutes seemingly relate only to cremation (one located among cremation regulations and the other entitled "Cremation"), the statutory language indicates that the right of disposition is not limited to cremation but extends to other means of disposition as well. However, it is clear from the sections that when no instructions are left, the default order of priority will be used, regardless of whether the right holder is responsible for the decedent's death.
d. South Carolina
Not only do the disposition of remains statutes in South Carolina lack forfeiture provisions, but they are also poorly constructed and unclear. First, laws governing disposition rights in South Carolina are not contained within a single statute. Under the regulations for embalmers and funeral directors, one statute provides that a public officer or "any other person having a professional relationship with the decedent" may not send remains to a funeral establishment "without having first made due inquiry as to the desires of the next of kin . . . . If any kin is found, authority and directions of the kin govern except in those instances where the deceased made prior arrangements in writing." 120 However, there is neither a definition of next of kin nor an order of priority as to who would make such decisions. Under the statutes governing the duties of coroners and medical examiners, one section provides that "[a]fter the postmortem examination, autopsy, or inquest has been completed, the dead body must be released to the person lawfully entitled to it for burial," indicating that there is one person in control-but the statutes lack a description of who has the ultimate authority.
121
Although South Carolina does not have a statute providing a clear order and priority of persons with the right of disposition, South Carolina courts have followed the common law rule that the right vests first in the surviving spouse, then in the next of kin.
122
Additionally, South Carolina recently amended its cremation authorization statute to provide that in the absence of a preneed cremation authorization in which a decedent specifies the final disposition of his or her cremated remains, there is an order of priority of persons who may authorize cremation. 123 The right first devolves upon a "person designated as agent for this purpose by the 118. Hernández, supra note 58, at 1020. 119. § 24-12A-2; § 61-32-19 ("not to be limited to cremation"). 
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COMMENT 231 decedent in a will or other verified and attested document" and if none exists, then upon "the spouse of the decedent." 124 The statute continues to list the next of kin in order of priority: adult children, surviving parents, adult siblings, adult grandchildren, grandparents, and so on. 125 While the South Carolina statutes are far from clear, the same order of priority as listed in the cremation authorization statute would likely also be used to establish the person in charge of determining the general method of disposition, whether or not that person killed the decedent.
e. Virginia
Virginia's disposition of remains statutes are simultaneously complicated and unique. In the chapter of the Virginia Code entitled "Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers," "next of kin" is defined as "any of the following persons, regardless of the relationship to the decedent: [ It is important to note the statutes' uses of the word "any"-Virginia is the only state to statutorily define the relatives who qualify as next of kin and grant them authority to control the disposition of remains but not provide any order of priority among the relatives.
128 Although a designated agent has the ultimate authority over any next of kin, no priority exists among the decedent's spouse and relatives with respect to the right to control disposition. 129 "a sequential hierarchy of relatives" but rather to keep the rights of the next of kin "broad and coequal." 130 One purpose of having a broad class of individuals is so that a body can be disposed of in an expeditious manner "without resort to the difficult and often confusing task of sequentially determining who within a blood line is entitled to claim the body that requires immediate attention." 131 However, Virginia acknowledges that disagreements may arise among the next of kin since the rights of the relatives are coequal; section 54.1-2807.01 states that in the absence of a designation, any relative may petition the court to "determine which of the next of kin shall have the authority to make arrangements for the decedent's funeral or the disposition of his remains." 132 The court must consider a list of factors in determining who should be authorized to make the decisions, including "the expressed wishes, if any, of the decedent, the legal and factual relationship between or among the disputing next of kin and between each of the disputing next of kin and the decedent, and any other factor the court considers relevant."
133
Though the statute does allow the next of kin to petition the court when disposition disputes arise, a slayer would still technically have a coequal right of disposition because forfeiture is not automatic. Furthermore, the language in the statute relating to disputes leaves open the possibility that a designated person could kill the victim and still have ultimate control over his or her disposition, without the family's ability to challenge.
134 This is because a designated agent has priority over all next of kin, 135 and the statute relating to disputes only allows family members to petition the court "[i]n the absence of a designation." 
States with Forfeiture Provisions
Although many state statutes currently do not provide for forfeiture, there has been legislative progress toward divesting slayers of disposition rights; presently, 28 states have some version service establishment and to the cemetery, if any, no later than 48 hours after the funeral service establishment has received the remains." (emphasis added)).
130 
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COMMENT 233 of a forfeiture provision within their disposition of remains statutes. 137 However, even among these statutes, there is wide variation. Some provisions only address situations in which the spouse is the killer, thereby not encompassing cases where another family member may be responsible for the death yet retains the right to control the disposition of the victim's remains. 138 Other provisions do not account for cases when the slayer may be designated as an agent for disposition. 139 Additionally, most provisions only contemplate forfeiture when criminal charges have been brought against the slayer, not reaching instances when law enforcement cannot establish probable cause or make an arrest before disposition decisions are made. 140 Lastly, most statutes do not allow a person whose right has been forfeited the ability to challenge the presumption that the forfeiture is just. The rest of the next of kin follow, but there is no provision relating to forfeiture in cases where a family member other than the spouse is responsible for the victim's death. New Jersey's forfeiture provision is likewise limited to spousal disposition rights as a result of the provision's placement. The statute first provides that a decedent may appoint a person in a will to control the disposition of remains.
143 However, if no appointment has been made and unless other directions have been given by a court of competent jurisdiction, the right shall go to:
(1) The surviving spouse of the decedent or the surviving civil union or domestic partner; except that if the decedent had a temporary or permanent restraining order issued . . . against the surviving spouse or civil union or domestic partner, or the surviving spouse or civil union or domestic partner is charged with the intentional killing of the decedent, the right to control the funeral and disposition of the remains shall be granted to the next available priority class as provided in this subsection. 
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This limitation appears to be the result of oversight on the part of the Legislature, as there is no justifiable reason to call for forfeiture only in the case of spousal killings but not other familial homicides. Moreover, the ill-considered placement of the forfeiture provision in several statutes creates another limitation: The provision does not take away rights if the victim specifically designated the slayer as an agent to control disposition. For example, New Jersey's statute provides first that if a decedent appoints a person to control disposition, the designee shall have priority over all other persons upon the decedent's death. 145 The default order is applicable only if no designation is made. However, the only provision providing for forfeiture is listed within the default order.
146 Consequently, the forfeiture provision does not apply when a person appointed to control disposition is the person who killed the decedent. This holds true for Florida's forfeiture provision as well. 147 It is unlikely that the state legislatures intended to create this loophole that allows a slayer to retain the right to dispose of his or her victim's remains if the victim previously designated the slayer to act as his or her agent for disposition.
Iowa's forfeiture provision, in contrast, only calls for forfeiture of a designee's authority and does not extend to rights granted to a person when no designation is made.
148 It provides: "A designee shall forfeit all rights and authority under a declaration . . . [if] [t]he designee is charged with murder in the first or second degree or voluntary manslaughter in connection with the declarant's death and those charges are known to a third party."
149 Thus, family members granted the power of disposition by law rather than by specific designation are not subject to forfeiture of their rights.
150 While Iowa's provision remedies the defect present in Florida and New Jersey's statutes, it has the effect, again likely unintentional, of not reaching slayers granted the right of disposition by statute rather than by designation.
Another drafting choice that limits the impact of current forfeiture provisions is that most state statutes require a person to be charged with an offense relating to the death before forfeiture takes place, 151 To address this situation one state, Vermont, goes so far as to require forfeiture if the right holder is a person of interest and likely to be prosecuted in connection with the decedent's death. 154 For example, in the case of Stephen Shepherd, he was labeled a person of interest and likely to be prosecuted during the time he was in hiding before his arrest. 155 In such situations, most forfeiture provisions would still permit suspected slayers to retain the right to dispose of their victims until the slayer has been formally charged. While Vermont expanded the coverage of its forfeiture provision by including "person of interest and likely to be prosecuted," this language could become problematic because the phrase "person of 
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interest" is not a formally defined term. 156 However, if forfeiture provisions only affect persons charged or arrested, suspected slayers may still be granted the right to control the disposition of their victims' remains, with their families having no recourse to challenge the authority.
b. Lack of Due Process Considerations
Although many states have automatic forfeiture provisions within their disposition of remains statutes, few grant notice of the forfeiture and an opportunity to challenge the presumption in a meaningful and timely manner to an individual who has forfeited the right of disposition. The absence of procedure to challenge the forfeiture may constitute a due process violation, as disposition of remains statutes grant a bundle of rights to the next of kin of decedents.
157 Though the right to dispose of remains is not a traditional property right, this statutory entitlement may rise to the level of a constitutionally protected interest.
158
The New York State Legislature considered the possibility that an alleged slayer may be wrongfully accused when it amended New York's disposition of remains law in 2012.
159 As a result, the Legislature included a provision allowing courts to waive the application of forfeiture in certain instances. 160 The statute provides that the application of the forfeiture provision "may be waived . . . in the interest of justice by order of . . . the court . . . in which the criminal action . . . is pending . . . [or] if proceeding in that court would cause inappropriate delay, a court in a special proceeding." 161 However, the statute provides little guidance as to when such waiver may be appropriate or if a person must receive notice of the forfeiture and the ability to challenge the deprivation. New York has at least considered the procedural concerns when depriving a person of a statutorily granted right; in contrast, most state statutes do not contemplate this matter. 
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III. GUIDANCE FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The majority of state statutory regimes relating to the disposition of remains currently fail both victims and surviving family members, as they either do not call for forfeiture in the case of murder or do not have comprehensive forfeiture provisions. The maxim underlying the slayer rule that no man shall take advantage of his own wrong should prevent slayers from having the right to dispose of their victims' remains, just as it does in the case of prohibiting the inheritance of property or life insurance benefits. The principles underlying the slayer rule also call for forfeiture of disposition rights. Morally, there is sanctity in life. Equitably, the slayer should not be granted a right by virtue of committing a crime. Legally, a slayer should not be permitted to control the disposition of a decedent's remains by bringing about the death. Presumably a victim would not want the person who took his or her life to make important decisions regarding the victim's final resting place. For these reasons, a slayer should and can be prevented from having the right to dispose of his or her victim's remains. 162 Every state must ensure not only that slayers are divested of the right to control their victims' final dispositions but also that families of victims are not deprived of this right. Making disposition arrangements is an integral part of the grieving process.
163 Homicide already victimizes survivors; their "trust in the world, spirituality, and beliefs about social order and justice can be devastated." 164 Furthermore, this process of making disposition and funeral arrangements often "assists survivors in coming to terms with the loss and their grief, particularly where the death was unexpected." 165 When the victim's family is deprived of this right and instead the slayer is granted control of the disposition, both the survivors and the decedent are victimized a second time. 162 . A slayer may choose to vindictively inflict more pain on the survivors by refusing to relinquish the body to the family and making decisions contrary to the victim's wishes. See, e.g 
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A. Determining the Proper Scope of Forfeiture Provisions
To protect victims' families and to keep such personal matters out of the hands of slayers, every state should extend the reasoning behind the slayer rule to provide for forfeiture of slayers' rights to dispose of their victims' remains. 166 But it is not enough that a disposition of remains statute contain a forfeiture provision. While the language and coverage of statutes may vary by state, the following fundamental requirements should be considered: (1) a clear order and priority of all persons who may be vested with the right to control disposition, whether by designation or by law; (2) an effective forfeiture provision that is triggered when any person granted the right is a suspect likely to be prosecuted, arrested, or charged with murder or voluntary manslaughter; and (3) a requirement that a person deprived of the right be afforded notice and a meaningful opportunity to challenge the forfeiture.
Ensuring All Potential Right Holders Are Subject to Forfeiture
When discussing familial homicides, spousal homicides are often the first category that comes to mind. The disposition of remains statutes in Florida and New Jersey are evidence of this, as their forfeiture clauses apply only to spouses, not other family members.
167 However, 12% of homicide victims are killed by other family members. 168 Thus, a family member may be criminally responsible for a decedent's death and yet still be vested with the right to control the disposition of the decedent's remains, for example, if the victim is unmarried or divorced. Consequently, forfeiture provisions must be positioned within disposition of remains statutes so as to affect all persons with the authority to control disposition, whether a spouse or any other person granted the right of disposition. States can easily ensure forfeiture provisions are applicable to all categories of potential right holders by first listing a clear order and priority of persons entitled to the right of 166. This Comment focuses on the need for forfeiture in instances when the person granted the right of disposition is criminally responsible for the decedent's death. However, many states choose to require forfeiture in other instances as well, for example, if there is an outstanding order of protection against an individual at the time of the decedent's death or if an individual vested with the right declines to act, is unable to act, does not act within a certain time period, or cannot be found. See, e.g 171 By drafting the statute in this manner, Indiana avoided the flaw present in Florida's and New Jersey's statutes: The forfeiture provision is applicable to any person who is granted the right of disposition, not just a spouse.
In addition to affecting all persons granted the right of disposition through the default order of priority, forfeiture provisions must also apply to right holders designated as agents for disposition. Presumably a victim would not want a person who brought about his or her death to control the disposition of the victim's remains, even if that person was previously designated as an agent to determine disposition, a power of attorney, or a designee to carry out the decedent's wishes. For this reason, forfeiture provisions should be crafted and positioned so that they divest slayers of the right to control disposition, no matter how or when such right is vested. By comprehensively covering all ways by which disposition rights can be vested, a forfeiture provision will effectively prevent slayers from controlling the disposition of their victims' remains.
172
The forfeiture provision in the Arkansas Final Disposition Rights Act of 2009 successfully applies to anyone granted the right of disposition, including designated agents. Under section (d)(1), the Act covers the order and priority of all persons who could potentially be vested with the right to control disposition, whether appointed by the decedent or granted the right by the default statutory order.
173 Then, section (e)(1) contains the forfeiture provision, which provides: "A person entitled under this section to the right of disposition shall forfeit that right" in certain instances, including murder. 174 Because the Act addresses all ways by which disposition rights can be bestowed and applies to all manners of disposition, the forfeiture provision within the Arkansas Final § 20-17-102 (Westlaw 2013 182 Thus, the forfeiture provision must specify when the forfeiture is triggered, as final arrangements ordinarily take place prior to the determination of criminal guilt.
183
Most of the currently enacted forfeiture provisions require a person to either be arrested or charged before forfeiture takes place. 184 However, states should expand their forfeiture provisions to include a suspect likely to be prosecuted in connection with the death.
185
Both the timing of disposition decisions and the potential delays involved in building a case to file charges justify such an extension. As opposed to the term "person of interest," "suspect" is formally defined, so there would be less ambiguity surrounding when forfeiture would apply.
186 By crafting forfeiture provisions to reach suspects likely to be prosecuted as well as those arrested or charged with murder or voluntary manslaughter, disposition rights will be kept out of the hands of those believed to be involved 188. Most forfeiture provisions also require that the status of the investigation, arrest, or prosecution be known to the funeral service or crematory practitioner in
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B. Safeguarding Due Process Rights
Just as the rights of victims and families are of high importance, so too are the rights of the accused. An alleged slayer should have the ability to challenge the forfeiture of the right of disposition, not only for policy reasons because a conviction has not yet taken place but also to satisfy procedural due process concerns that are likely implicated when depriving a person of the right of disposition. . . shall present the . . . death certificate to the attending physician of the decedent, the coroner, or the medical examiner, as appropriate for certification of the cause of death.").
189. There are two general categories of due process: substantive due process and procedural due process. 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1505 . Whereas substantive due process prohibits governmental interference with rights rooted in the concept of liberty, procedural due process "requires government action resulting in the deprivation of a liberty or property interest to be implemented in a fair manner." Id. The central issue that arises with forfeiture provisions is whether there are constitutionally adequate procedures surrounding the deprivation, not whether the state has the power to deprive someone of the right of disposition. See id. § § 1443-1444 . Accordingly, this Comment addresses procedural due process instead of substantive due process.
190. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Forfeiture provisions in disposition of remains laws clearly constitute a deprivation under the color of state law since the deprivation is provided for by state statute. Thus, the remaining questions are whether forfeiture of the right of disposition qualifies as a deprivation of a protectable interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and, if so, "whether the state afforded constitutionally adequate process for the deprivation." Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 789 (9th Cir. 2002 ) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1981 , overruled on other grounds, Daniels v.
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[Vol. 74 treated as property in the traditional sense, the next of kin are entitled to certain statutory rights in remains. 191 Consequently, the issue at hand is whether the deprivation of a statutorily granted right of disposition in remains is an interest entitled to procedural due process protection.
192
Because property interests are created by state law and not by the Constitution, courts look to applicable state law to determine whether a property interest exists. 193 However, "federal constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' protected by the Due Process Clause."
194 Thus, the determination of whether the right of disposition is protected by the Due Process Clause does not depend on whether the state classifies the interest in remains as property, quasi-property, or not property, 195 S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ). Although it is conceivable that the right of disposition could constitute a liberty interest, this seeming difficulty of categorizing the right as a liberty or property interest can be avoided for the purposes of this Comment, as both are entitled to procedural due process protections. 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1444 ) ("When a state action threatens to deprive a person of a protected liberty or property interest, a person is entitled to procedural due process.").
193. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571 ("Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law . . . .").
194. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972) ).
195. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991 ) (stating that the identification of property interests for due process purposes turns on the substance of the interest recognized, not the name given to that interest by the state).
196. 198 In order to avoid potential due process violations, states should provide an avenue to ensure that the deprivation is executed in a fair manner. 199 Due process is a flexible concept that differs depending on a particular situation, 200 but "[t] he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. '" 201 The Supreme Court has consistently "held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest." 202 Yet, most states with forfeiture provisions currently do not provide any procedure allowing an alleged slayer to challenge the deprivation, which would likely constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of a protectable interest since no determination of guilt has yet been made. 203 Accordingly, states should amend their disposition of remains statutes to require a person statutorily deprived of the right of disposition to be given notice of the deprivation as well as the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
To adequately protect due process rights, forfeiture hearings should take place quickly before any action is taken with respect to
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CONCLUSION
Legislatures have the power to prevent murder victims from being victimized after death and their survivors from being wronged a second time by ensuring that final disposition rights do not fall into the hands of slayers. The solution is a simple one-a disposition of remains statute containing a provision that calls for forfeiture if the person with the right to control disposition is a suspect likely to be prosecuted, arrested, or charged in connection with the decedent's death. So long as there is a means for the accused to challenge the forfeiture in a timely manner, the statute will adequately protect due process rights as well as victims' families who may otherwise have to watch their loved ones be disposed of by their slayers. Slayers should not be permitted to take advantage of their wrongdoing, and state statutes should not be the source granting slayers the right to do so. This Comment was written in loving memory of the author's grandmother, Nancy Kramer Walsh. The author would like to thank her parents, Karen and Brian Bremenstul, for their endless strength and support, her aunt, Judy Wayland-Smith, for both her courage and encouragement to bring about change, her advisor, Professor Melissa T. Lonegrass, for her invaluable guidance throughout the writing process, and the members of the Louisiana Law Review for their hard work and dedication in preparing this Comment for publication.
